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Abstract
This article uses the case study of the question of whether human rights treaty
law applies extraterritorially as a means of exploring the general theme of the
value of the International Court of Justice’s involvement in human rights,
when compared to such involvement by specialist human rights bodies. The
Court’s express pronouncements on the issue, in the Wall Advisory
Opinion, the DRC v. Uganda judgment, and the Provisional Measures
Order in Georgia v. Russia, as well as an earlier more general statement in the
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Namibia Advisory Opinion, are compared to determinations on the issue by
specialist courts and tribunals. The article begins by setting out the broader his-
torical context of the ICJ’s involvement in human rights issues. It then analyses
the different ways in which this involvement can be critically appraised, in the
processmaking the case for the focus adopted herein, on a comparison between
the role of the Court and that of specialist human rights tribunals on issues of
meaning/interpretation rather than application/enforcement, and, within
this, on comparative analysis concerned with the generalist/specialist distinc-
tion itself rather than the relative merits of positions taken on the substantive
law. Such a focus is then deployed through a detailed critical evaluation of
the Court’s statements in the decisions indicated. Finally, the article sum-
marizes the signiﬁcance of the Court’s determinations on the extraterritorial
application of human rights law, and the broader relevance of these determina-
tions for understanding the role of the ICJ in the ﬁeld of human rights more
generally.
I. Introduction
Is there something the ICJ should do in the ﬁeld [of human rights] that specialised
courts cannot do, or that the Hague Court might be able to do better?
Bruno Simma (writing in a personal capacity)1
1. The International Court of Justice now has a signiﬁcant track record of involvement
in human rights issues, acting as a body thatmakes pronouncements on themeaning of
the law in this ﬁeld and applying the law to particular situations, supplementing the
more long-standing and wide-ranging activities of specialist human rights courts and
tribunals.2 What is the value of having the plenary generalist body involved alongside
1 Bruno Simma,MainstreamingHumanRights: TheContribution of the International
Court of Justice, 3(1) Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2012) 7–29.
2 See the following commentary, and the cases referred to in it: Egon Schwelb,The Inter-
national Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter, 66 AJIL
(1972), 337, 348; Nigel S. Rodley, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention:
The Case Law of the World Court, 38 ICLQ (1989), 321; Stephen M. Schwebel,
Human Rights in the World Court, 24 Vanderbilt J Transnational L (1991) 945;
StephenM. Schwebel,HumanRights in theWorldCourt, in:R. S. Pathak (ed.), Inter-
national Law in Transition: Essays in Memory of Judge Nagendra Singh (Martinus
Nijhoff, 1992), 267; Stephen M. Schwebel, The Treatment of Human Rights and
of Aliens in the International Court of Justice, in: Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitz-
maurice (eds), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in honour of
Sir Robert Jennings (CUP 1996), 327; Rosalyn Higgins, The International Court
of Justice and Human Rights, in: Karen Wellens (ed.), International Law: Theory
and Practice: Essays in Honour of Eric Suy (Martins Nijhoff 1998), 691; Alison
Duxbury, Saving Lives in the International Court of Justice: The Use of Provisional
Measures to Protect Human Rights, 31 California Western ILJ (2000), 141; Jonas
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Grimheden, The International Court of Justice in Furthering the Justiciability of
Human Rights, in: Gudmundur Alfredsson et al. (eds.), International Human
Rights Monitoring Mechanisms (Kluwer 2001), 469; Raymond Goy, La Cour Inter-
nationale de Justice et les droits de l’homme (Bruylant, 2002); AntonioCassese,When
May Senior StateOfﬁcials Be Tried for International Crimes? SomeComments on the
Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EJIL (2002), 853, 867-870; Vladlen S. Vereshchetin and
C.J. LeMon, Immunities of Individuals under International Law in the Jurisprudence
of the International Court of Justice, 1 The Global Community Yearbook of Inter-
national Law and Jurisprudence (2004), 77, 88; Shiv R.S. Bedi, The Development
of Human Rights Law by the Judges of the International Court of Justice (Hart,
2007); Rosalyn Higgins, Human Rights in the International Court of Justice, 20(4)
Leiden JIL (2007), 745; Gentian Zyberi, The Development and Interpretation of
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Rules and Principles Through
the Case-Law of the International Court of Justice, 25 Netherlands QHR (2007),
117; Gentian Zyberi, The Humanitarian Face of the International Court of Justice:
Its contribution to interpreting and developing international human rights and hu-
manitarian law rules and principles (Intersentia, 2008); Jonas Grimheden, The Inter-
national Court of Justice—Monitoring Human Rights, in: Gudmundur Alfredsson
et al. (eds), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms. Essays in
Honour of Jacob Th. Moeller (2009), 249; Rosalyn Higgins, A Babel of Judicial
Voices? Ruminations From the Bench, 55 ICLQ (2006), 791; Rosalyn Higgins, A
Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench, in: Rosalyn Higgins,
Themes and Theories, Selected Essays, Speeches and Writings in International Law
(OUP, 2009), Pt. 10, ch. 1; RosalynHiggins, Anna LindhMemorial Lecture: Disper-
sal andCoalescence in InternationalHumanRights Law, in: RosalynHiggins, Themes
and Theories, Selected Essays, Speeches and Writings in International Law (OUP,
2009), Pt. 5, ch. 17; Conor McCarthy, Reparation for Gross Violations of Human
Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law at the International Court of
Justice, in: Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz and Alan Stephens (eds.), Reparations
for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes: Systems in Place and
Systems in the Making (2009), 283; Gentian Zyberi, Self-determination Through
the Lens of the International Court of Justice, 56 Netherlands ILR (2009) 429;
Sandesh Sivakumaran, The International Court of Justice and Human Rights, in:
Sarah Joseph and Adam McBeth (eds.), Research Handbook on International
Human Rights Law (Edward Elgar Press 2010), 299; Gentian Zyberi, The Inter-
national Court of Justice and Applied Forms of Reparation for International Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law Violations, 7(1) Utrecht LR (2011), 204; Djamchid
Momtaz and Amin Ghanbari Amirhandeh, The Interaction between International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law and the Contribution of the ICJ, in:
Karine Bannelier, Théodore Christakis and Sarah Heathcote (eds.), The ICJ and the
Evolution of International Law, The Enduring Impact of the Corfu Channel Case
(Routledge, 2011), ch. 16; Bruno Simma, above n.1; Bruno Simma, The ICJ and
Human Rights, in: Christian J. Tams and James Sloan (eds), The Development of
International Law by the International Court of Justice (OUP, 2013), ch. 10;
Gentian Zyberi, The ICJ and Rights of Peoples and Minorities, Christian J. Tams
and James Sloan (eds), The Development of International Law by the International
Court of Justice (OUP, 2013), ch. 13.
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specialist bodies as international mechanisms concerned with the interpretation and
application of human rights law? Is it simply “more of the same” or, as Bruno
Simma asks, is there something qualitatively different to and beneﬁcial in the involve-
ment of the Court?
2. This question has been explored within academic commentary predominantly as
part of general reviews of the treatment of the full spectrum of human rights issues
within the Court’s jurisprudence.3 The issues in question cover a range of different
areas of law including, but not limited to, human rights treaty law, for example
taking in customary international law on self-determination, the law of immunity,
treaty law, United Nations law, international criminal law, international humanitarian
law, andoccupation law. Such abroad canvas is helpful in capturing the range and scope
of the Court’s involvement in human rights issues.However, as ameans of considering
the particular question of the merits of having an international generalist court, qua its
generalist orientation, involved in human rights issues, it is limited because the “other”
comparator partly required in the analysis—the judicial or quasi-judicial enforcement
body with a specialist competence in the particular area of law in question—varies sig-
niﬁcantly (e.g. when international criminal tribunals are compared to human rights
institutions) or is absent (e.g. in the case of international humanitarian law outside
of international criminal law) depending on the area of lawunder evaluation.Moreover,
the value of universalizing comparisons between the roles of a range of specialist bodies
concernedwithdifferent areas of law, on the onehand, and the role of theCourt in these
areas of law, on the other hand, is further diminished by the scant and piecemeal nature
of the Court’s jurisprudence in any given area, and the consequent difﬁculties of
drawing meaningful, generalizable conclusions from modest evidence.
3. As a complementary contribution to the existing literature on the general topic of
the ICJ and human rights, and offering sustained treatment of a particular area of law
that has hitherto not been offered in this literature, the present article uses the case study
of the extraterritorial application of human rights treaty law as a means of exploring the
general theme of the value of the ICJ’s involvement in human rights. The case study
concerns the entry-level question of whether human rights treaties apply extraterrito-
rially at all, a fundamental matter of the very operation of obligations which, as will
be explained, has been and remains a contested issue. It focuses on the signiﬁcance
of express pronouncements by the Court on this issue, placed in the wider context of
corresponding determinations by specialist courts and tribunals.
4. The Court’s pronouncements were made in three cases: the Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories Advisory Opinion of
2004 (hereinafter Wall Advisory Opinion); the Case Concerning Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda) judgment of 2005 (hereinafter DRC
v. Uganda); and the 2008 Order Indicating Provisional Measures in the Application of
3 Ibid.
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the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation) case (hereinafter Georgia v. Russia (Provisional Mea-
sures)).4 As will be discussed, the signiﬁcance of these pronouncements to the law on
the extraterritorial application of human rights treaty law builds on a statement in
the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion (hereinafter Namibia Advisory Opinion) from decades earlier, 1971.5 Al-
though not about this this area of law as such, that statement can nonetheless be
regarded as foundational to how the law is now understood.
5. The article begins in Section II by setting out the broader historical context of the
ICJ’s involvement in human rights issues. Then in Section III it analyses the various
different ways in which this involvement can be critically appraised, in the process
making the case for the focus adopted herein, on a comparison between the role of the
Court and that of specialist human rights tribunals on issues of meaning/interpretation
rather than application/enforcement, and, within this, on comparative analysis con-
cerned with the generalist/specialist distinction itself rather than the relative merits of
positions taken on the substantive law. Such a focus is then deployed in Sections IV–
X through the case study of the Court’s treatment of the question of the extraterritorial
application of human rights treaties in the Wall Advisory Opinion, the DRC
v. Uganda judgment, and Georgia v. Russia (Provisional Measures). Finally, Section XI
summarizes the signiﬁcance of the Court’s determinations on extraterritoriality, and
sets out the lessons suggested by these determinations for broader understandings of
the role of the ICJ in the ﬁeld of human rights.
II. Historical developments in human rights law and at the ICJ
6. One of the main developments in the subject-matter covered by international law
occurring over the lifespan of the International Court of Justice has been the
4 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tories, Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ Reports 163 (9 July) (hereinafter Wall Advisory
Opinion); Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Request for the Indication of Provisional
Measures, Order of 1 July 2000, [2000] ICJ Reports 111; Case Concerning Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v.Uganda), Judgment of 19December 2005 (hereinafterDRCv.Uganda Judgment),
paras.216–217;Applicationof the InternationalConventionon theEliminationofAll
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Order Indicating Provisional Measures, 15 October
2008 (www.icj-cij.org/docket/ﬁles/140/14801.pdf (last visited 3November 2013))
(hereinafter Georgia v. Russia (Provisional Measures)), paras.109, 149.
5 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(SouthWestAfrica)Notwithstanding SecurityCouncil Resolution 276 (1970), Advis-
ory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, 16 (hereinafter Namibia Advisory Opinion).
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emergence of and rapid expansion in the coverage of human rights in international
treaty law.6 Moreover, the establishment and then operation of the jurisdiction of
dedicated mechanisms for the interpretation and application of these human rights
instruments constituted one of the main ways in which the ICJ came to share its
position as an international judicial body with other international courts and
quasi-judicial bodies.7
7. It is commonplace to describe the situation during the period in which human
rights treaties and their enforcement bodies were established as one where the ICJ’s
docket predominantly addressed a narrow set of issues, such as boundary disputes,
6 On this development, see e.g. RosalynHiggins, The International Court of Justice and
Human Rights, above n.2, 693; Rosalyn Higgins, Human Rights in the International
Court of Justice, above n.2, 745; Rosalyn Higgins, Anna Lindh Memorial Lecture,
above n.2, passim. For the instruments the provisions of which be addressed in the
present piece, see American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted
by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá, Colombia,
1948, OAS Res. XXX (1948) (hereinafter American Declaration) [not a treaty]; Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (hereinafter ECHR); ECHR Protocol No. 1;
ECHR Protocol No. 6; ECHR Protocol No. 13; Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, New York, 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS
277; Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery, Supplementary to the International Convention signed
atGeneva on25September 1926,Geneva, 7 September 1956; InternationalCovenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (herein-
after ICESCR); InternationalCovenant onCivil andPolitical Rights,GARes. 2200A/
XXI, 16 December 1966, UN Doc. A/6316 (19 December 1966), 999 UNTS. 171
(hereinafter ICCPR); American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969,
O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 UNTS 123, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/
II.23, Doc. 21, Rev. 6 (22 November 1969); International Convention on the Elim-
ination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Adopted by General Assembly Reso-
lution 2106 (XX), 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (hereinafter CERD or
ICERD); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimin-
ation Against Women, New York, 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (hereinafter
CEDAW); The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (OAU Doc. CAB/
LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 27 June 1981) (hereinafter ACHPR); Convention on the Rights
of the Child, GA Res. 44/25, Annex, 44 UN GAOR Supp. No. 49, UN Doc.
A/44/49 (20November 1989), 1577UNTS 3 (hereinafter CRC);Optional Protocol
to theConvention on theRights of theChild on the Involvement ofChildren inArmed
Conﬂict of 2000 (CRC Optional Protocol); Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA Res. 46, UN GAOR,
39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, UN Doc. A/39/51, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS
85 (hereinafter CAT).
7 On this, see e.g. RosalynHiggins,HumanRights in the International Court of Justice,
above n.2, 745.
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commonly characterized as inter-State in character.8 The international supervision of
the human rights situation within States, as far as compatibility with the provisions of
human rights treaties was concerned, was the exclusive preserve of human rights-speciﬁc
bodies, if it occurred at all. The right to self-determination came before theCourt in the
decisions about South West Africa/Namibia and the Western Sahara, but only in its
‘colonial’ manifestation, and as a matter of the entitlements of people vis-à-vis States
who did not enjoy title over the territory in which those people resided, rather than
the rights of people within their own State.9
8. The end of ColdWar led to inter-related trends that substantially altered the char-
acter of theCourt’s work: an increasedwillingness of States, of amore diverse geograph-
ic, economic andmilitary character, to have their disputes submitted to the Court, and
the Court’s docket expanding in both quantum and the range of areas of international
law being addressed.10 As the increase in the types of disputes and applicable law oc-
curred, so human rights matters outside the ﬁeld of self-determination came into the
frame.
9. The Court’s jurisprudence on human rights issues, including international crim-
inal law, is now signiﬁcant.11 Although the Court is not a “human rights court”, it has
nonetheless become a court thatmakes decisions in the human rights ﬁeld, rather like a
domestic generalist court with plenary jurisdiction with respect to a legal systemwhich
includes human rights norms.12
8 See e.g. the discussions in Bruno Simma, above n.1; Gentian Zyberi, The ICJ and
Rights of Peoples and Minorities, above n.2; and Rosalyn Higgins, Legal Disputes
and Political Realities: The Current Role of the International Court of Justice,
Sydney Bailey Memorial Lecture, 3 March 2000 (http://website.lineone.net/
~ccadd/3mar00_sbml.htm (last visited 3 November 2013)), section II.
9 SouthWest Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Prelimin-
aryObjections, 21Dec. 1962, (1962) ICJReports 319; SouthWestAfricaCases (Ethi-
opia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, 18 July 1966, (1966) ICJ
Reports 6; Namibia Advisory Opinion, above n.5;Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion
(1975) ICJ Reports 12.
10 Gentian Zyberi, The International Court of Justice and Applied Forms of Reparation,
above n.2, 29.
11 See the commentary listed above, n.2, and sources cited therein.
12 Writing in a personal capacity in 1998, having reviewed the Court’s jurisprudence up
to that point, Rosalyn Higgins observed that “notwithstanding that the International
Court of Justice is not a human rights court as such, it is fully engaged in the judicial
protection of human rights.”RosalynHiggins, The International Court of Justice and
HumanRights, above n.2, 703. Almost a decade later, she observed, again in a personal
capacity, that “We may be sure that the International Court of Justice, while not a
‘human rights court’ as such, will continue to play a major role in the protection of
human rights.” Rosalyn Higgins, Anna Lindh Memorial Lecture, above n.2, 19. See
also Sandesh Sivakumaran, above n.2, 325.
Wilde, Human Rights Beyond Borders at the World Court 645
 at U
CL Library Services on July 24, 2014
http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
10.Human rightsmatters addressed by the Court have included, in addition to self-
determination, the following: the law on genocide including the deﬁnition of the crime
(the actus reus andmens rea elements andwhich groups comewithin its protection) and
the applicability of the prohibition of genocide to States; certain aspects of treaty law in
the context of human rights treaties, notably on reservations and succession/accession
issues; the interplay between the lawof State immunityand the lawof universal criminal
jurisdiction in the context of serious crimes; the law of diplomatic protection; the ap-
plication of human rights law in situations of war and occupation where the law of
armed conﬂict/humanitarian law/occupation law are also applicable; and the protec-
tion of individuals under humanitarian law.13
11. This involvement by the ICJ in human rights matters has been linked by com-
mentators to the broader trend within the UnitedNations of “mainstreaming” human
rights at the Organization (of which the ICJ is of course the “principal judicial
organ”14): complementing the treatment of human rights issues within dedicated
mechanisms, hitherto the predominant or even exclusive forum for such treatment,
with treatment in other, “generalist”, non-human-rights-speciﬁc bodies.15 Put from
the perspective of international law, Rosalyn Higgins (writing in a personal capacity)
observes that the Court has played a major role in the “embedding” of the “protection
of human rights” within the “broader setting of international law”.16 Bruno Simma
(also writing in a personal capacity) makes a similar point using the UN language of
“mainstreaming”, with an additional, striking characterization of the ICJ and general
international law, on the one hand, and human rights bodies and human rights law,
on the other, as, respectively, the “old” and the “new”:
If we wanted to ﬁnd a short-term description for our topic of the International
Court of Justice and human rights, we could call it an instance of international
legal discourse in which old international law (represented for our purpose by
the Court) encounters the new. What we can observe already is that the Court
has become a major player in a process in which human rights and general inter-
national law mutually impact upon one another: human rights “modernize”
13 The sources cited above, n.2, provide an extensive coverage of this, including citations
to the relevant case law.Foranoverviewof the relevant case law, see e.g.GentianZyberi,
The International Court of Justice and Applied Forms of Reparation, above n.2, 195;
Gentian Zyberi, The ICJ and Rights of Peoples and Minorities, above n.2, passim;
Sandesh Sivakumaran, above n.2, passim and in particular 319–320 (on genocide),
310 (on treaty law), 214 (on humanitarian law).
14 UN Charter, art. 92.
15 Gentian Zyberi, The International Court of Justice and Applied Forms of Reparation,
above n.2, passim; Bruno Simma, above n.1, 29.
16 Rosalyn Higgins, Anna Lindh Memorial Lecture, above n.2, 19.
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international law, while international law “mainstreams”, or “domesticates”,
human rights”.17
12. As the judicial careers of Rosalyn Higgins and Bruno Simma demonstrate, this ex-
pansion fromthe specialist to the generalist is symbolizedby themovement of anumber
of jurists with experience in human rights law (thoughusually as part of a generalist pro-
fessional expertise) onto the bench of the Court. Considering membership on the
bench during the period when one or more of the three decisions under present evalu-
ationwere issued, some judges had previously served on international human rights en-
forcement bodies: Judge Higgins was a former member of the UN Human Rights
Committee;18 Judge Pieter Kooijmans was a former UN Special Rapporteur on
Torture and President of the UN Commission on Human Rights;19 Judge Thomas
Buergenthal was a former President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
and member of the UN Human Rights Committee;20 and Judge Simma was a
former member of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.21
Othermembers had previous experience of diplomatic service for their countries of na-
tionality that involved participation in human rights bodies (Judge Leonid Slotnikov22
17 Bruno Simma, above n.1, 29.
18 Judge Higgins was a member of the Court from 1995 to 2009: see ICJ, All Members
List (www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=2 (last visited 3 November
2013)). On her membership of the UN Human Rights Committee, see e.g. Inter-
national Balzan Prize Foundation, Rosalyn Higgins (www.balzan.org/en/
prizewinners/rosalyn-higgins (last visited 3 November 2013)).
19 JudgeKooijmanswas amemberof theCourt from1997 to 2006: see ICJ, AllMembers
List, above n.18.Onhis tenure asUNSpecial RapporteuronTorture andChairman of
theUNCommission onHuman rights, see Peace Palace Library, InMemoriam Pieter
Hendrik Kooijmans (1933-2013), Former Judge of the International Court of Justice
(26 February 2013) (www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/2013/02/in-memoriam-pieter-
hendrik-kooijmans-1933-2013-former-judge-of-the-international-court-of-justice/
(last visited 3 November 2013)) and Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment (www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Torture/SRTorture/Pages/
SRTortureIndex.aspx (last visited 3 November 2013)).
20 Judge Buergenthal was a member of the Court from 2000 to 2010: see ICJ, All
Members List, above n.18. On his position at the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights and on the UN Human Rights Committee, see The George Washington
University, Faculty Directory: Thomas Buergenthal (www.law.gwu.edu/faculty/
proﬁle.aspx?id=1758 (last visited 3 November 2013)).
21 Judge Simma was a member of the Court from 2003 to 2012: see ICJ, All Members
List, above n.18. On his membership of the UN Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, see University of Michigan, Faculty Biographies: Bruno
Simma (www.law.umich.edu/FacultyBio/Pages/FacultyBio.aspx?FacID=simmab
(last visited 3 November 2013)).
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and Judge Peter Tomka23); previous experience of practice in human rights law (Judge
Ronny Abraham24); previous publications on human rights law (Judge Bernardo
Sepulveda-Amor25); and previous such publications and involvement in human
rights issues as a component of the applicable law on the senior national courts on
which he sat (Judge Kenneth Keith26). RosalynHiggins, writing in a personal capacity
about the membership of herself and Judges Kooijmans, Buergenthal and Simma on
the Court, observed that:
The presence of these judges on the bench, providing a “critical mass” of persons
particularly versed in human rights law, has contributed, I believe, to human
rights being viewed as in the centre of what the Court does, not at the margin.27
13. The effect of the expansion in the range of international law topics addressed by the
Court is that inmany areas of international law, the ICJ nowa source of potentially per-
suasive andauthoritative interpretation to a greaterextent andacross a broader spectrum
of the international legal ﬁeld than was the case previously. This is an especially signiﬁ-
cant development in the area of international human rights law, where theCourt’s pro-
nouncements donot sit largely alone as judicial determinations of the area of lawat issue
(unlike, it might be said, in the ﬁeld of the use of force). On human rights matters, the
Court’s jurisprudencehas tobe situated in, andcomparedwith, themore long-standing
jurisprudence of specialist human rights bodies.
22 Judge Slotnikov was previously a member of the Russian delegation to UN human
rights Commission; he has been on the Court since 2006: see ICJ, Current
Members: Judge Leonid Skotnikov (www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=
2&p3=1&judge=159 (last visited 3 November 2013)).
23 Judge Tomka was in 1996 Chairman of the Meeting of the States Parties to the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; he has been on the Court since 2003:
see ICJ, Current Members: President Peter Tomka (www.icj-cij.org/court/index.
php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=15 (last visited 3 November 2013)).
24 Memberof theCourt from2005: see ICJ,CurrentMembers:CurrentMembers: Judge
Ronny Abraham (www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=
136 (last visited 3 November 2013)).
25 Member of the court since 2006: see ICJ, CurrentMembers: Vice-President Bernardo
Sepúlveda-Amor (www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=
158 (last visited 3 November 2013)).
26 Judge Keith was a member of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of New
Zealand; he has been on the Court since 2006: see ICJ, Current Members: Judge
Kenneth Keith (www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=157
(last visited 3 November 2013)).
27 RosalynHiggins, HumanRights in the International Court of Justice, above n.2, 746.
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III. Appraising the ICJ’s treatment of human rights law
As Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court envisages the Court’s jurisdic-
tion extending to disputes arising from treaties, all of this vast explosion of human
rights conventions could, it might have been thought, lead to a heavy human rights
component in the Court’s work. The reality, however, is different. Only a few of the
human rights treaties contain a speciﬁc compromis clause referring to the Court…
Further, some of the great human rights instruments have their own judicial settle-
ment procedures.
Rosalyn Higgins (writing in a personal capacity in 1998)28
14. What role has the Court had, and should it have, on human rights matters, given
that it co-habits with other specialist bodies, its contentious jurisdiction is open only
to States, not also to individuals, and only fewof thewide range of human rights treaties
contain compromissory clauses that enable States to refer disputes to it?29
15.On a basic level, the ICJ’s entry into the judicial application and enforcement of
human rights lawadds to the sumtotal of such treatmentby international expert bodies.
So it could be said that although, for the foregoing reasons, the ICJmay not be involved
inmany human rights cases, the involvementwhich does happen should be regarded as
beneﬁcial (if the quality of the Court’s reasoning is sound, amatter which has been dis-
puted in someof its human rights cases, as explored further below), in that it adds, albeit
modestly, to the quantumof international institutional application and enforcement of
human rights law (assuming, of course, the merit of such application and enforcement
in the ﬁrst place).30
16. Clearly, however, more can be said about the merits of the Court’s involvement
than simply the observation that it is “more of the same” (and the cognate normative
assumption that the “same” is of merit). One way into the possible avenues of
enquiry here is via the distinction that canbemade in the role of anyexpert bodyaddres-
sing human rights law between, on the one hand, being engaged in pronouncing on the
substance of the law itself—clarifying its meaning, for example, through interpreting
28 Rosalyn Higgins, The International Court of Justice and Human Rights, above n.2,
693–694.
29 An example of such a compromissory clause would be CERD, above n.6, art. 22.
30 For Rosalyn Higgins, writing in a personal capacity about the Court’s involvement in
human rights law, “the promotion of effective guarantees of human rights requires a
common endeavour across a broad front.” Rosalyn Higgins, The International
Court of Justice and Human Rights, above n.2, 703. For Sandesh Sivakumaran,
“the Court has not always covered itself in glory and the position is too nuanced to
say that theCourt has consistently developedhuman rights law”, but it “… can certain-
ly stand alongside other bodies that are tasked to uphold the protection of human
rights. For one that is not a human rights court, it has done much to further their pro-
tection.” Sandesh Sivakumaran, above n.2, 325.
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treaty provisions—and, on the other hand, applying this law to the particular facts
before it, leading to a result that potentially “enforces” this law with respect to a
given situation, including through the provision of remedies.31
17. In the context of human rights, this distinction takes on a particular signiﬁcance
at the ICJ given that individuals do not have direct standing before the Court. As far as
enforcement/remedies are concerned, the Court is structurally deﬁcient on this key
standing matter when compared to human rights bodies to which individuals have
direct access.
18. Thus the Court is unable to provide remedies directly to individuals; moreover,
the exclusion of access the Court of those whose interests are directly as stake in human
rights cases also, of course, reduces the likelihood that such cases will go before the
Court in the ﬁrst place, compared to human rights tribunals where individuals have
direct standing. More fundamentally, the inter-State character of the Court’s jurisdic-
tion (in the sense that its contentious jurisdiction is only for States, and its advisory jur-
isdiction, as far as general legal questions are concerned, requires States members of the
General Assembly or the Security Council to agree on requests), means that even when
human rights matters come before the Court, there is still potentially a State-centric
orientation to the treatment of such matters. In explaining the modest number of
human rights cases before the Court, Bruno Simma (writing in a personal capacity)
argues that:
…we are looking at the “wrong relationship” here: approaching human rights
problems, above all the issue of violations, from an inter-State perspective can
only bring to the fore, and solve, certain limited aspects of these problems.
The ICJ will deal with violations of human rights as matters of State responsibil-
ity, and State responsibility is typically [in the words of Robert McCorquodale]
“law by states for states”.32
19. How might the “inter-State” perspective lead to only “limited” aspects of human
rights problems being addressed? One potential area is in the level of detail that the
Court is willing and able to go into when applying the law to the facts in human
rights cases and making determinations on compliance, when compared to such will-
ingness and ability by human-rights-speciﬁc bodies. In her Separate Opinion to the
Court’s Wall Advisory Opinion, Judge Higgins, while agreeing with the Court’s
ﬁnding on what she termed the “relevance of human rights law in occupied territor-
ies”33—what will be discussed below as matter of whether or not human rights law
31 On this distinction in the context of the ICJ’s decisions on human rights matters, see
also Sandesh Sivakumaran, above n.2, 325.
32 Bruno Simma, above n.1, 15, quoting Robert McCorquodale, Impact on State
Responsibility, in: Menno T. Kamminga and Martin Scheinin (eds), The Impact of
Human Rights Law on General International Law (OUP 2009), 235, 236.
33 Wall Advisory Opinion, above n.4, sep. op. para.25 (Higgins).
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applies extraterritorially on the basis of effective territorial control—expressed reserva-
tions about the quality of the Court’s substantive determination in applying this law to
the facts. For Judge Higgins,
… it has to be noted that there are established treaty bodieswhose function it is to
examine in detail the conduct of States parties to each of the Covenants. Indeed,
the Court’s response as regards the… [ICCPR] notes both the pertinent juris-
prudence of theHumanRightsCommittee and also the concluding observations
of the Committee on Israel’s duties in the occupied territories.
So far as the [ICESCR] is concerned, the situation is even stranger, given the
programmatic requirements for the fulﬁlment of this category of rights. TheCourt
has been able to do no more than observe, in a single phrase, that the wall and its
associated regime
“impede the exercise by the persons concerned of the right towork, to health, to
education and to an adequate standard of living as proclaimed in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights…” (para.134).
For both Covenants, one may wonder about the appropriateness of asking for
advisoryopinions fromtheCourtoncompliancebyStatespartieswith suchobliga-
tions, which aremonitored, inmuch greater detail, by a treaty body established for
that purpose. It could hardly be an answer that theGeneral Assembly is not setting
any more general precedent, because while many, many States are not in compli-
ance with their obligations under the two Covenants, the Court is being asked to
look only at the conduct of Israel in this regard.34
Drawingon someof the ideas in these comments itmight be argued that the value of the
Court in applying human rights law to any given situation is questionable when a spe-
cialist body already performs this function (cf. the initial comment about the ICCPR),
given the Court’s decision to make a pronouncement on compliance with rights of a
programmatic character that is so generalized as to be, one might say, of questionable
worth (cf. the comment on the ICESCR) and bearing in mind the relatively greater
detail that human rights-speciﬁc enforcement bodies go into (cf. the comment on
both Covenants).
20. However, the potential role of the Court on the issue of the meaning/interpret-
ation of the law, as distinct from its application of the law to the facts—in theWall case,
the initial issue, to be addressed later, that Judge Higgins agreed with, of whether
the two Covenants even applied extraterritorially in the ﬁrst place—is of a different
character.
21. Questions of the meaning/interpretation of the law require, to be sure, consid-
erable intellectual deliberation, but not detailed factual and evidential assessment. The
Court is in no worse a position to engage in such a deliberation when compared to
34 Ibid. paras.25–26.
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human rights tribunals, as a simple a matter of practicality and detail (the question of
expertise will be addressed momentarily). If, however, this negative aspect is absent,
what of the question of the positive case? The more essential question raised by
Judge Higgins in the context of application/enforcement remains as far as interpret-
ation is concerned: what does it add to have the Court doing this in addition to the spe-
cialist bodies? It is just, as asked earlier, “more of the same”?
22. Obviously, the ICJ differs from specialist tribunals in the potential breadth of
applicable law that can be applied by it.35 An aspect of this wide-ranging role is that
for the Court, dealing with the fundamental contested aspects of particular areas of
law is commonplace. It might be said, by contrast, that in the jurisprudence of
human rights tribunals the balance in the quantum of cases is tilted further towards
matters of detailed application to the facts as distinct from fundamental contests over
the meaning of the legal norms themselves. Just as it might be argued, as reviewed
earlier, that human rights tribunals are better suited tomatters of enforcement and rem-
edies becauseof their detailed focus andextensive experience, so it could alsobe said that
the ICJmight bemore self-assured and capable onmatters of interpretation, including
on fundamentalmatters, because of the frequencywithwhich itmust engage in judicial
determinations of this type (all other things being equal).
23. One basis for assessing the merit of the Court’s pronouncements on human
rights law is a consideration of how these pronouncements compare to the treatment
of the same issues by specialist bodies. Within this question a distinction needs to be
made between the related questions of whether the Court ﬁts within/departs from
approaches taken by other bodies, and whether the approach taken by the Court is
regarded to be meritorious.
24. A signiﬁcant body of commentary this topic links these two issues in the sense
that consistency is regarded as beneﬁcial. For Sandesh Sivakumaran, for example,
The protection of international human rights by courts and tribunals is aided by
the consistency of their jurisprudence. The extent to which the Court has
adopted or departed from the jurisprudence of other human rights bodies thus
merits consideration… [the] interlocking network of adjudicatory bodies and
their consistence of jurisprudence can only be of beneﬁt to the protection of
human rights.36
35 In the words of Gentian Zyberi,
Having no limitations over its subject matter jurisdiction, the ICJ offers a judicial forum in
whichmuch interpretation andprogressive development of different branches of internation-
al law can take place.
GentianZyberi, The InternationalCourt of Justice andApplied Forms ofReparation, above n.2,
297.
36 Sandesh Sivakumaran, above n.2, 303 and 305.
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Sometimes this linked concept of consistency as a good appears to be tied to the idea of
relative expertise of the specialist bodies: thus the emphasis seems to be placedmore on
the Court following the specialist bodies than vice versa. Bruno Simma, writing in a
personal capacity, observes that:
The court has been increasingly supportive of human right claims and it has
demonstrated that it can handle human rights in a way considered respectable
also by the “droits de l’hommistes”. In this regard, it has caught upwith the exist-
ing human rights courts.37
Rosalyn Higgins, also writing in a personal capacity, observes that:
The acknowledged expertise of these specialist human rights courts and bodies,
and the desire to avoid fragmentation, provide an impetus for all concerned to
seek common solutions on evolving points of law. If the Court would seem to
be acting cautiously in this regard, it is certainly not acting negatively.38
Before, the very involvement of the Court in matters of application/enforcement was
questioned by Judge Higgins in light of the more “detailed” existing role of the en-
forcement bodies. Here, a somewhat equivalent relative merit appears to be ascribed
to the latter, in this case because of expertise, and with the consequence not of ques-
tioning the involvement of the Court in and of itself, as before, but, rather, accepting
(or, at least, not challenging) such involvement but perhaps suggesting something
akin to respect, even deference, on the part of the Court to the specialist bodies.
Of course, the tenure of Rosalyn Higgins, Bruno Simma and their fellow “human
rights” judges on the Court indicates that questions of relative expertise in human
rights law of members of the bench at the ICJ as compared to human rights tribunals
are not straightforward.
25. Beyond issues of consistency in light of the Court’s co-existence with human
rights bodies, further approaches to the substantive merits of the Court’s treatment
of human rights law are more focused on this treatment on its own terms, not with ref-
erence to other treatment elsewhere, although some of the ideas generated in this
context are clearly transferrable to comparative analysis. Two approaches can be iden-
tiﬁed here. Under the ﬁrst approach, the Court has been engaged in the “clariﬁcation”
of human rights law, and that this has been beneﬁcial.39 The second approach distin-
guishes between “progressive” and “conservative” approaches which encapsulate
37 Bruno Simma, above n.1, 25.
38 RosalynHiggins, Human Rights in the International Court of Justice, above n.2, 749.
39 For Zyberi, the court has “clariﬁed how certain human rights rules and principles were
to be understood and applied”.GentianZyberi, The InternationalCourt of Justice and
Applied Forms of Reparation, above n.2, 294. Sivakumaran describes the Court’s role
as “clarifying the normative status of particular instruments and speciﬁc rights”.
Sandesh Sivakumaran, above n.2, 307.
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similarly vague notions of being “pro” or “anti” human rights, corresponding to posi-
tions that are typically regarded (often implicitly) as respectively meritorious and to be
criticized.40 The potential link between such approaches and the earlier focus on con-
sistency with human rights tribunals is illustrated by the previous quote from Bruno
Simma that links the Court’s consistency with human rights tribunals to being
“supportive of human rights”.
26.Thenotionof clariﬁcation as a good implicitly, and assessments of being “pro”or
“anti” human rights explicitly, presuppose more fundamental positions on contested
matters in the ﬁeld of human rights. Clariﬁcation as a good is at best thin and at
worst ignoring a more fundamental matter if not allied to a notion that the particular
position being clariﬁed is ofmerit, thereby requiring a position to be taken on themore
fundamental “pro”or “anti”human rights issue.Andonedoes not have tobe a relativist
to accept that reasonable people can disagree on what is and is not “pro” or “anti”
human rights. In any case, such analysis is a matter of general human rights theory
and case law, capable of application to the jurisprudence of all judicial bodies, specialist
tribunals and thegeneralist court alike. It is, tobe sure, a fundamentally importantques-
tion, but ultimately not directly about the topic of the relativemerits and capabilities of
specialist versus generalist courts.41
27. To establish a link between the underlying question and the topic at hand, one
would appraise the substantivemerit of the position taken by theCourt on the question
of extraterritoriality according to some general theory about human rights relevant to
that question, and then use this as a basis for comparing the Court’s position with
40 For example, Zyberi takes the position that “the court has generally taken a ﬁrm pos-
ition in favour of human rights”. Gentian Zyberi, The International Court of Justice
and Applied Forms of Reparation, above n.2, 294.
41 Although some seem to worry that the ICJ may be more likely to be “conservative” on
human rights issues than the specialist tribunals. Bruno Simma observes that specialist
bodies have been behind the
… great advances of international human rights law . . . have developed doctrines and rules
custom-made for human rights… whichmight go too far formore conservative circles of the
legal mainstream. This acquis must not be levelled by the participation in the discourse of a
generalist court such as the ICJ.
Bruno Simma, above n.1, 26. Simma’s concerns are tied to his focus on the “inter-State” char-
acter of the Court. He asks:
[C]ouldwe exclude that at least part of its clientelemight be somewhat less than enthusiastic if
the ICJ assumed (more pronounced) features of a human rights court?
Ibid. Simma states that:
… the development of international human rights will not infrequently upset sovereignty-
based rules of international lawwithwhichmost Stateswill have been, and still are, quite com-
fortable.
Ibid. 27.
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that of specialist tribunals, and drawing conclusions about the relativemerits of the two
types of forums in terms of the substantive positions they take. Ultimately, the key
contest would be on the underlying question: this would determine the outcome on
the relative merits issue.
28. As this article is not an effort to provide a theory to address the underlying ques-
tion ofwhether human rights law should apply extraterritorially—a topic that is worthy
of lengthy treatment in and of itself42—it is not concerned with the ultimate merit of
the positions taken by the Court on this question.43
42 For academic commentary on this topic, see e.g. Fons Coomans and Menno Kam-
minga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (2004); Silvia
Borelli, Casting Light on the Legal Black Hole: International Law and Detentions
Abroad in the “War on Terror”, 87 IRRC (2005), 39; Michael J. Dennis, Application
of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conﬂict and Military
Occupation, 99 AJIL (2005), 119; RalphWilde, Legal “BlackHole”?: Extraterritorial
State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and Political Rights, 26 MJIL
(2005), 739; Sigrun Skogly, BeyondNational Borders: States’Human Rights Obliga-
tions in International Cooperation (Intersentia 2006); Ralph Wilde, Case Note,
R. (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of State for Defence (The Redress Trust intervening), 102
(3) AJIL (2008), 628; MichałGondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising
World: Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia, 2009);
Ralph Wilde, From Trusteeship to Self-Determination and Back Again: the Role of
the Hague Regulations in the Evolution of International Trusteeship, and the Frame-
work of Rights and Duties of Occupying Powers, 31 Loyola of Los Angeles Inter-
national and Comparative Law Review (2009), 75; Mark Gibney and Sigrun Skogly
(eds), Universal Human Rights and Extraterritorial Obligations (University of Penn-
sylvania Press 2010); RalphWilde, Compliance with Human Rights Norms Extrater-
ritorially: “Human Rights Imperialism”?, in: Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and
Marcelo Kohen (eds), International Law and the Quest for its Implementation,
Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Brill/Martinus Nijhoff 2010), ch. 16;
Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Prin-
ciples, andPolicy (OUP2011);VariousAuthors,MaastrichtPrinciplesonExtraterritor-
ialObligations of States in the area of Economic, Social andCultural Rights, adopted 28
September 2011; Fons Coomans and Rolf Künnemann, Cases and Concepts on Extra-
territorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia
2012); Karen da Costa, The Extraterritorial Application of Selected Human Rights
Treaties (Brill 2012); Malcolm Langford, Wouter Vandenhole, Martin Scheinin and
Willem van Genugten (eds), Global Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (CUP 2013).
43 Others have pronounced on this issue. Shiv Bedi states that, by determining that
ICCPR, the ICESCR and the CRC apply extraterritorially, the ICJ has
… universalised the territorial application of human rights law and circumvented the trad-
itional sovereign power of States in depriving individuals, irrespective of their nationality,
of their human rights and respect for human dignity. This is a step forward for the cause
ofhumandignityand a stepbackward for the traditional narrowmeaningof State sovereignty.
Shiv R.S. Bedi, above n.2, 344.
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29.Rather, it is concernedwith the secondorder issue ofwhat a comparisonbetween
the pronouncements of the Court and the position taken by specialist bodies on this
issue might say about relationship between the two and the role of the Court in
human rights jurisprudence qua generalist Court. In other words, what can be said
on the generalist/specialist issue as distinct from the substantive-merits-of-the-
position-taken issue?
30. The focus will be placed on the signiﬁcance, as discussed above, of the Court’s
involvement in questions of meaning/interpretation rather than application/enforce-
ment, when compared to such involvement by specialist bodies. The case study of the
question of whether human rights law applies extraterritorially will be used to test
whether there is merit in what has been suggested in the foregoing analysis: Does the
Court have the potential, in some instances, to make a positive difference on questions
of interpretation in theﬁeld of human rightswhen compared to specialist bodies, and, if
so, what factors might be relevant in determining when this possibility might arise?
IV. The contested issue and treaty law framework
on extraterritoriality
31. The Court’s determinations on the question of the extraterritorial application of
human rights treaty law obligations were made at the time when this question was
highly contested.44 The entry-level matter of the very applicability of the obligations
themselves—as distinct from consequential questions, such as what they would
mean were they to apply, how this meaning would be mediated by the interplay with
other applicable law, etc.—was disputed.45 Such a situation was possible in part
because the relevant provisions of the treaties contain terminology on applicability
that lack a clear indication of spatial scope.
32. Some of the main treaties addressing civil and political rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the American Convention on
Human Rights (ACHR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
and their Protocols, the Convention Against Torture (CAT), as well as the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which also covers economic, social and cultural
rights, conceive obligations as operating in the State’s “jurisdiction”. Under the
ECHR and some of its Protocols and the ACHR, the State is obliged to “secure” the
rights contained in the treaty within its “jurisdiction”.46 Under the CAT, the State is
obliged to take measures to prevent acts of torture “in any territory under its
44 See generally the sources cited above, n.42, and, e.g.RalphWilde, Legal “BlackHole”?,
aboven.42, 776–778. Sandesh Sivakumaranhighlights this signiﬁcance in theCourt’s
intervention on the topic. See Sandesh Sivakumaran, above n.2, 307.
45 See the sources cited ibid.
46 See ECHR, above n.6, art. 1; ACHR, above n.6, art.1.
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jurisdiction”.47 Under the CRC, States parties are obliged to “respect and ensure” the
rights in the treaty to “each child within their jurisdiction”.48 The ICCPR formulation
is slightly different from the others in that applicability operates in relation to those
“within [the State’s] territory and subject to its jurisdiction”.49
33. Thus a nexus to the State—termed “jurisdiction”—has to be established before
theState’s obligations are inplay (the signiﬁcance of the separate reference to“territory”
in the ICCPRwill be addressed below). As theGrandChamber of the EuropeanCourt
of Human Rights stated in the Al-Skeini decision about the applicability of the ECHR
to the activities of UK forces in Iraq,
“Jurisdiction”underArticle 1 is a threshold criterion.The exercise of jurisdiction
is a necessary condition for a Contracting State to be able to be held responsible
for acts or omissions imputable to it which give rise to an allegation of the
infringement of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention.50
34.Certain other international human rights instruments do not contain a general pro-
vision, whether using the term “jurisdiction” or some other equivalent expression,
stipulating the scope of applicability of the obligations they contain: the 1948 (Inter-)
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (not a treaty), the 1981
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 1965 International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the 1979 Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conﬂict of 2000.51
35. What might be called a “free-standing” model of applicability echoes the pos-
ition under certain other treaties concernedwithwarfarewhich include provisions con-
cerned with the treatment of individuals, such as Common article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, according to which contracting parties undertake “to respect
and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.”52
47 CAT, above n.6, art. 2.
48 CRC, above n.6, art. 2.1.
49 ICCPR, above n.6, art. 2.
50 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 55721/07, Judgment of 7
July 2011, (hereinafter Al-Skeini (ECtHR)), para.130.
51 American Declaration, above n.6; ACHPR, above n.6; CEDAW, above n.6; CERD,
above n.6; CRC Optional Protocol, above n.6.
52 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75UNTS 31, art. 1; Geneva Con-
vention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85,
art. 1; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, art. 1; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative
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36. In the case of the CERD, a sub-set of obligations are conceived in the context of
the State’s “jurisdiction”. The obligation concerning racial segregation and apartheid
applies to parties with respect to “territories under their jurisdiction.”53 Similarly,
the provision of remedies operates with respect to people in the State’s “jurisdiction”,
in terms of both the obligation borne by the State to provide such remedies itself, and
the jurisdiction of the international Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrim-
ination, if it has been accepted, to hear complaints against parties.54Moreover, as far as
the Inter-American Declaration is concerned, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights has treated the instrument as if it does contain the “jurisdiction”
trigger, without an explanation for this assumption.55
37.The obligation to secure the economic, social and cultural rights contained in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) does not
include a dedicated stipulation concerning spatial applicability. The relevant provision
obliges parties
to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-
operation…with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized in the present Covenant.56
38.The vagueness of theprovisions in the instruments reviewed enables the scopeof the
spatial applicability of these instruments to be easily disputed. “Jurisdiction” could be
regarded as a synonym for presence in sovereign territory only, thereby ruling out extra-
territorial applicability. Alternatively, it could be deﬁned in someway that includes, but
is not limited to, a State’s presence in its sovereign territory, but is deﬁned in a manner
that only covers a sub-set of extraterritorial activities (e.g. requiring a certain level of
control), thereby creating the possibility for disagreements over which activities are
covered. “Free-standing” obligations could be regarded as operating in any spatial
zone in which the State is present, or, alternatively, a claim could be made that a limi-
tation to sovereign territory should be read into them.
V. Decisions by other bodies and the ICJ
39. By the time the ICJ came to pronounce upon the extraterritorial applicability of
certain of the aforementioned human rights treaties, there were already other decisions
( judicial, quasi-judicial, advisory) on the topic, and the process of overlapping
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75
UNTS 287, art. 1.
53 CERD, above n.6, art. 3.
54 CERD, above n.6, arts. 6 (domestic remedies), 14.1 ( jurisdiction of the Committee).
55 Coard v. U.S., Case 10.951, Report No.109/99, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.85, doc. 9 rev.
(1999), para.37.
56 ICESCR, above n.6, art. 2.
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deliberations continued during the period in which the Court became seized of the
topic. Prominent were decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee
(expressed through Views andGeneral Comments),57 the UnitedNations Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,58 the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights,59 the European Commission and Court of Human Rights,60 the
57 HRCGeneral Comment No. 31, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (26May
2004), para.10; Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 56/1979, UN
Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979 (29 July 1981) (Celiberti de Casariego), para.10.3;
Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.12/52, Supp. No. 40, 176, UN
Doc. A/36/40 (1981), para.12.3; Mabel Perreira Montero v. Uruguay (Montero),
Comm. No. 106/1981, UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2, 136 (1990) (31 March 1983),
para.5.
58 ESCR Committee General Comment No. 2, International technical assistance mea-
sures (art. 22), 4th session (1990), in: Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc.
HRI\GEN\1\Rev.7 (2004), at 12, paras.6, 7(d), 9; ESCR Committee General
Comment No. 3, The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (art. 2(1)), 5th session
(1990), in: Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.7 (2004), at
15, paras.13, 14; ESCR Committee General Comment No. 8, The Relationship
between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 17th session (1997), in: Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI\GEN
\1\Rev.7 (2004), at 51; ESCR Committee General Comment No. 12, The Right to
Adequate Food (art. 11), 20th session (1999), in: Compilation of General Comments
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UNDoc.
HRI\GEN\1\Rev.7 (2004), at 63, paras.36, 37; ESCRCommitteeGeneralComment
No. 14:TheRight to theHighestAttainable Standard ofHealth (art. 12), 22nd session
(2000), in: Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.7 (2004), at
86, para.39.
59 Coard, above n.55, paras.37, 39, 41.
60 Hess v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, ApplicationNo. 6231/73, 2 Eur. CommissionH.
R. Dec. & Rep. 72 (1975); Gillow v United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 13/
1984/85/132, Judgment of 23 October 1986, para.62; Bui Van Thanh v. United
Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 16137/90, European Commission of Human
Rights, Judgment of 12 March 1990; WM. v. Denmark, Application. No. 17392/
90, 73 Eur. Commissionn H.R. Dec. & Rep. 193 (1992), 196, Section “The Law”,
para.1; Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, 14 ECtHR. 745 (1992); Loizidou
v. Turkey, 310 ECtHR (ser. A) (1995) (PreliminaryObjections) (hereinafter Loizidou
(Preliminary Objections)), para.62; Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI, ECtHR, (ser. A)
2216, (GC) (Merits), (hereinafter Loizidou (Merits)), paras. 52–56; Illich Sanchez
Ramirez v. France, Application No. 28780/95, 86 Eur. Commission H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 155 (1996); Yonghong v. Portugal, Application no. 50887/99, ECtHR, Judg-
ment of 25 November 1999 (Yonghong); Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No.
46221/99, ECtHR, Admissibility Decision, (14 December 2000), (hereinafter
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UnitedNations Committee Against Torture,61 theUnitedNations Committee on the
Rights of the Child,62 and judgments of domestic courts such as in the United
Kingdom.63
40. The question of the extraterritorial applicability of human rights law treaties
raised in the ICJ cases concerned the applicability of these treaties to Israel in the Pal-
estinian Territories in the context of the occupation in general and the construction of
Öcalan Admissibility Decision), Section “The Facts”, para.1; and Öcalan v. Turkey,
2005-IV ECtHR (GC) (Öcalan GC), para.91; Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV ECtHR,
1 (GC), para.77; Issa and others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Admissibility Decision of 30
May 2000; Issa and others v. Turkey, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 27 (2004) (Merits), para.71;
Banković v. Belgium, 2001–XII ECtHR, 333 (GC), paras.70–71; Ilascu and
others v. Moldova and Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 48787/99 [Grand
Chamber], Reports 2004-VII (8 July 2004); Solomou v.Turkey, ECtHR,Application
No. 36832/97, Judgment of 24 June 2008, paras.43–52; Isaak v. Turkey, ECtHR,
Application No. 44587/98, Judgment of 28 Sept 2006, Admissibility, p. 21 (herein-
after Isaak (Admissibility)); Behrami and Behrami v. France, and Saramati v. France,
Germany and Norway [GC], ECtHR, Application Nos. 71412/01 and 78166/01,
Admissibility Decision, 31 May 2007 (hereinafter Behrami and Saramati); Pad and
others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 60167/00, 28 June 2007; Andreou
v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 45653/99, Admissibility decision, 3 June
2008, p. 11; Andreou v. Turkey, ECtHR, Application No. 45653/99, Merits, 27
October 2009, para.25; Al-Saadoon andMufdhi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Appli-
cation No. 61498/08, Chamber decision, 2 March 2010; Al-Skeini (ECtHR), above
n.50; Medvedyev and others v. France, Application No. 3394/03, ECtHR, Grand
Chamber decision, 29 March 2010; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, Appli-
cation No. 27765/09, Grand Chamber decision, 19 January 2012; Catan and others
v.Moldova and Russia, ECtHR, Applications Nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/
06 Grand Chamber (19 October 2012).
61 Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Conven-
tion, Conclusions and Recommendations: United States of America, UNDoc. CAT/
C/USA/CO/2 (25 July 2006), para.15;GeneralCommentNo.2, Implementationof
Article 2 by States Parties, 23 November 2007, UN doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (24 January
2008), para.16.
62 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Israel, UN
Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.195, 4 October 2002, paras.2, 5, 57–58.
63 R v. Immigration Ofﬁcer at Prague Airport and another (Respondents) ex parte Euro-
pean Roma Rights Centre and others (Appellants) [2004] UKHL 55, 9 December
2004 (hereinafter Roma Rights); R (Quark Fishing Ltd) v. Secretary of State for the
Foreign&Commonwealth Affairs [2005] UKHL57, 13October 2005; R (on the ap-
plication of Al-Skeini and others) v. Secretary of State for Defence (The Redress Trust
intervening) [2007]UKHL26; [2007] 3WLR33 (hereinafter Al-Skeini (HL)); R (on
the applicationofAl-Skeini andothers) v. Secretaryof State forDefence [2005]EWCA
(Civ) 1609 (21December 2005) (hereinafter Al-Skeini (CA)); R (on the application of
Al-Skeini and others) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2004] EWHC 2911 (Admin),
14 December 2004 (hereinafter Al-Skeini (DC)).
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the separation barrier in particular, toUganda in theDRC in the context of themilitary
action by the latter in the territoryof the former, and toRussia inGeorgia in the context
ofRussia’s support for the breakawayRepublics ofAbkhazia andSouthOssetia, includ-
ing through military action in 2008. The treaties at issue were the ICCPR (Wall and
DRC v. Uganda), the CRC (DRC v. Uganda), the CRC Optional Protocol (DRC
v. Uganda), the African Charter (DRC v. Uganda), the ICESCR (Wall Advisory
Opinion) and the CERD (Georgia v. Russia).
41. Just as in general many of the States who act extraterritorially—and whose legal
position is, therefore, directly at stake—refute applicability in this context, so the three
States whose obligations were being determined in these cases—Israel, Uganda and
Russia—advanced the view that the treaties at issue did not apply to them in the terri-
tories under consideration.
42. The way the Court rejected these positions, and afﬁrmed extraterritorial applic-
ability, involved a series of assertionswith amore general signiﬁcance for the debates on
applicability. Moreover, as will be explained, the Court’s contribution to understand-
ings of what obligations shouldmean in the extraterritorial context builds uponwhat it
had said decades previously in the Namibia Advisory Opinion concerning South
Africa’s obligations to the people of that Territory. The Court’s contribution in this
ﬁeld can be divided up into ﬁve distinct elements. These elements will be set out in
the following sections.
43. In the ﬁrst place, in the Namibia Advisory Opinion, the Court established the
principle that territorial control also, rather than the enjoyment of territorial sovereign-
ty (that is, title), only, should be the basis for the operation of State obligations in
general. Although not a determination speciﬁcally about international human rights
treaty obligations, this broad proposition paved the way for later decisions about
human rights law by both human rights bodies and subsequently the Court itself.
44. In the second place, for treaties containing the “jurisdiction” trigger for applic-
ability, theCourt both supported prior afﬁrmations byother bodies that this trigger has
an extraterritorial dimension, and offered original afﬁrmations of its own.
45. In the third place, for treaties that have a “free standing”model of applicability,
the Court has for some instruments treated them as if they did contain a “jurisdiction”
clause, which operates extraterritorially, and for other instruments afﬁrmed extraterri-
torial application in a simpler fashion.
46. In the fourth place, the Court’s pronouncement upon the “exceptional” nature
of extraterritorial activities is potentially signiﬁcant for the regulation of these activities
by human rights law when compared to similar pronouncements by certain other
bodies.
47. Similarly, in the ﬁfth place the Court’s approach to the application of human
rights treaty obligations to a State acting in territory not forming part of the territory
of another State also party to the same treaty is highly signiﬁcant given what has
been suggested by certain other decisions on this matter.
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VI. The Court’s contribution (1): Signiﬁcance of control versus
sovereignty; effective control as a trigger
48. In the Namibia Advisory Opinion the ICJ stated that South Africa, which at the
time was unlawfully occupying Namibia, was
… accountable for any violations… of the rights of the people of Namibia. The
fact that South Africa no longer has any title to administer the Territory does not
release it from its obligations and responsibilities under international law towards
other States in respect of the exercise of its powers in relation to this Territory.
Physical control of a territory, and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the
basis of State liability for acts affecting other States.64
This Opinion was issued before the main decisions by human rights bodies on the
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties.65 It is not, of course, a decision
about human rights-speciﬁc treaty law as such, although it concerns the “rights of
the people ofNamibia”. The reference to “obligations and responsibilities under inter-
national law towardsother States” and“liability foracts affectingotherStates” adopts an
inter-State focus, although such a focus can includehuman rights given that obligations
of this type are contained in treaties between States, and that certain such obligations
(including those at issue here, the prohibition of racial discrimination and the right
of self-determination) are regarded as operating erga omnes, implicating a generalized
community interest on the part of all States.
49. Whatever the intended meaning in the case of South Africa and the people of
Namibia, and signiﬁcance for rules concerning applicable law in general, and human
rights law in particular, as a general proposition the echo of this statement can be
traced through later decisions on the applicability of human rights treaty law, in two
related but distinct respects.
50. In the ﬁrst place, the fundamental point that State responsibility should not be
limited to situations where a State enjoys title is the basic underpinning of extraterritor-
ial applicability. In the second place, the particular concept of “physical control over
territory” as a basis for determining where obligations should subsist has been
adopted in later human rights decisions, notably those made in interpreting the
meaning of “jurisdiction” in the European Convention on Human Rights, as one of
the two main triggers for extraterritorial applicability, the second being a concept of
control exercised over individuals.66 The extraterritorial applicability of human
64 Namibia Advisory Opinion, above n.2, 54, para.118.
65 See the sources cited above, nn.50, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63.
66 See the discussion and sources cited below, para. 55.
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rights treaties based on the exercise of control over territory—the “spatial” or “territor-
ial” trigger—ﬁnds its origin in this more general concept from the ICJ.67
51. It would be no exaggeration to say, then, that the ideas ﬁrst judicially afﬁrmed by
the ICJ are the underpinning of both the notion of the extraterritorial application of
human rights law itself, and also one of the two main ways in which the trigger for
such application has been deﬁned. They foreground subsequent approaches taken on
these issues by human rights bodies and the Court itself.68 In retrospect, it can be
said that the ground breaking decision on the extraterritorial application of human
rights law came from the ICJ, not from a human rights tribunal, and well before the
canonical decisions were issued on the topic by human rights tribunals.
52. Just as the Court paved the way for later approaches taken on extraterritorial ap-
plicability that were directly concerned with human rights treaty law, so too the Court
later became involved in offering approaches of its own to the topic. Bearing in mind
Bruno Simma’s “old” versus “new” distinction mentioned earlier, we see, on this
topic, the “old” Court applying “old” general international law, not “new” human
rights law, to craft an idea which then re-appears in that “new” law, and then later
returns to the “old” body, to be re-determined there, now in its manifestation as part
of the “new” ﬁeld of law. The distinctions between old/new, general international
law/international human rights law, and the ICJ/specialist tribunals, helpful for
certain purposes, must not obscure the provenance and journey of an underlying idea.
53. The Court’s contribution on the extraterritorial application of human rights
treaty law can be split into different elements, beginning with the question of the
extraterritorial meaning of the term “jurisdiction” as used in human rights treaties.
VII. The Court’s contribution (2): Afﬁrming the extraterritorial
meaning of “jurisdiction”
54. The general refutation of the extraterritorial application of human rights law men-
tioned earlier, made by many of the States which would be subject to the obligations
were they to apply, including Israel, Uganda and Russia with respect to the three ICJ
decisions in this ﬁeld, has been primarily concerned with the term “jurisdiction” in
some of the main human rights treaties. This term, it is argued, means the State’s pres-
ence in its sovereign territory only, and so in circumstances where it serves as the trigger
for applicability, the relevant obligations do not apply extraterritorially.69 In the
67 See ibid.
68 Sandesh Sivakumaran observes that the Court’s later decisions on the extraterritorial
application of the ICCPR, ICESCR and CRC (addressed herein below in sections
VII–X) are “timely and important” but also “no more than the speciﬁc application
to human rights treaties of” this earlier idea. Sandesh Sivakumaran, above n.2, 309.
69 See e.g. the discussion in Ralph Wilde, Legal “Black Hole”?, above n.42, 776–778,
and sources cited therein.
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particular case of the ICCPR provision on applicability, which as mentioned earlier
addresses those “within [the State’s] territory and subject to its jurisdiction”, the argu-
ment is made that the inclusion of the word “territory” in addition to “jurisdiction”
should be read to suggest that jurisdiction is limited to territory, thereby ruling out
extraterritorial applicability.70Arguments have also beenmade against the extraterritor-
ial applicationof the ICESCR, forexampleby Israel in the context of the situation in the
Palestinian territories.71
55. Even before the Wall Advisory Opinion and the DRC v Uganda and Russia v
Georgia decisions were issued by the ICJ, the consistent position adopted in relation
to international human rights instruments by international review bodies was the op-
posite of the rejectionist position. The term “jurisdiction” in the ECHR,ACHR,CAT
and CRC has been interpreted to operate extraterritorially in certain circumstances.72
The aforementioned treatment of the applicability of the (Inter-)AmericanDeclaration
by the Inter-American Commission onHuman Rights in terms of the exercise of “jur-
isdiction” was in the context of extraterritorial activity, which it regarded as capable of
constituting the exercise of jurisdiction and thereby falling under the scope of the obli-
gations in the Declaration.73 The ICCPR was interpreted as applying extraterritorially
by theUNHumanRights Committee in Views issued in 1981 andGeneral Comment
31 of 2004.74 In general, the term “jurisdiction” has been deﬁned extraterritorially as
the exercise of control over either territory—the concept, indicated earlier,whichhas its
origins in theNamibiaAdvisoryOpinion, sometimes referred to as the “spatial”or “ter-
ritorial” deﬁnition75—or individuals, sometimes referred to as the “individual”, “per-
sonal” or, because of the identity of the foreign State actor involved, “State agent
authority” deﬁnition.76
70 See the discussions in the literature cited above, n.42; for one example of a commen-
tator who advocates this position, see Michael J. Dennis, above n.42. For Israel’s pos-
ition with respect to the ICCPR, see e.g.Wall Advisory Opinion, above n.4, para.110,
and sources cited therein.
71 See the Wall Advisory Opinion, above n.4, para. 112.
72 See decisions cited above nn.50, 59, 60 61, 62.
73 Coard, above n.55, para.37.
74 HRC General Comment No. 31, above n.57; Lopez Burgos; above n.57.
75 See e.g.Cyprus v.Turkey, above n.60; Loizidou (PreliminaryObjections), above n.60;
Loizidou (Merits), above n.60; Banković, above n.60; Al-Skeini (DC), above n.63;
Al-Skeini (CA), above n.63; Al-Skeini (HL), above n.63; Al-Skeini (ECtHR), above
n.50; Issa, above n.60.
76 Celiberti de Casariego, above n.57, para.10.3; Lopez Burgos, above n.57, para.12.3;
Öcalan (GC), above n.60, para.91; Isaak (Admissiblity), above n.60, 21; Coard,
above n.55, paras.1–4, 37, 39, 41; Al-Skeini (DC), above n.63; Al-Skeini (COA),
above n.63; Al-Skeini (HL), above n.63, passim; Al-Saadoon, passim, above n.60;
WM, above n.60, 196, section “The Law”, para.1; Montero, para.5, above n.57.
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56. The signiﬁcance of the ICJ’s determinations on this issue was to bolster some of
the afﬁrmations of extraterritorial applicability that had already been made by expert
bodies in relation to the ICCPR and the CRC.
57. In the Wall Advisory Opinion and the DRC v. Uganda judgment the Court
afﬁrmed that the ICCPR is capable of extraterritorial application.77 This bolsters the
credibility of the Human Rights Committee’s position on this question, and, by the
same token, the credibility of the rejectionist view is weakened. It is also signiﬁcant
more broadly within the Court’s jurisprudence because the Human Rights Commit-
tee’s position is expressly cited by the Court in its reasoning on the issue in the Wall
Advisory Opinion, both as a general matter, and as far as the position of Israel in the
Palestinian territories in particular is concerned (the reasoning in DRC v. Uganda
merely invokes the Court’s earlier reasoning in the Wall Advisory Opinion in
summary form).78 Just as its decisions on extraterritorial applicability constitute
some of the main decisions by the Court on human rights law generally, so here a de-
cision in this category is a landmark in the broader theme of the Court’s express use of
the decisions of other courts and tribunals.
58. In a similar fashion, in the same two decisions the Court provided authority for
the extraterritorial application of the CRC, as with theHuman Rights Committee and
the ICCPRearlier, bolstering the position of theCommittee on the Rights of theChild
on this issue (although, in contrast,without referring to the latterCommittee’s position
on the issue).79
59. Before the ICJ became involved, the position on the extraterritorial applicability
of the term “jurisdiction”whenused in human rights treatieswas limited to afﬁrmation
by the UNHumanRights Committee and the Committee on the Rights of the Child,
whose decisions, although important and inﬂuential, are formally non-judicial and
non-binding, and theEuropeanCommission andCourt ofHumanRights,whosedeci-
sions are necessarily speciﬁc to the ECHR and its Protocols even if often containing
logic that is clearly transferrable to equivalent provisions in other treaties. The extrater-
ritorial applicabilityof the ICCPRand theCRCcouldbe rejected on the grounds that it
had not been afﬁrmed by a body other than the Committees associated with the two
instruments, that the positions of those Committees were non-binding, and that
77 Wall Advisory Opinion, above n.4, paras 107–111; DRC v. Uganda, above n.4,
paras.216–217.
78 Wall AdvisoryOpinion, above n.4, para.109 (on the Committee’s general position on
extraterritorial applicability), para.110 (on the Committee’s position on Israel in the
Palestinian territories in particular); DRC v. Uganda, above n.4, para.216.
79 Wall Advisory Opinion, above n.4, para.113; DRC v. Uganda Judgment, above n.4,
paras.216–217. On the decisions of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, see
above, n.62.
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decisions made with respect to the European Convention on Human Rights were
irrelevant.80
60. After these ICJ cases, the positions of the Human Rights Committee and the
Committee on the Rights of the Child with respect to the CRC and the ICCPR
were no longer isolated, and, moreover, had been endorsed by a body with formal ju-
dicial status, and in a multi-faceted fashion that both afﬁrmed the position as general
proposition and applied it to the facts of two separate situations, Israel in Palestine
and the DRC in Uganda, in the latter case in a binding judgment.
61.More broadly, the quantumof authoritative interpretationon the question of the
extraterritorial applicability of the term jurisdiction across international human rights
treaties generally had become signiﬁcantly greater, in that jurisprudence from specialist
human rights bodies was joined by the preeminent, generalist court.
VIII. The Court’s contribution (3): Afﬁrming the extraterritorial
applicability of other treaties with free-standing obligations
62. As mentioned above, some treaties operate in a free-standing sense, in that they do
not contain express provisions stipulating their general spatial ﬁeld of application.
Debates about this spatial ﬁeld are concerned not with the meaning of an ambiguous
term (as in the earlier contest over the meaning of “jurisdiction”) but, rather, on
whether, as mentioned, the lack of an express provision renders the treaties always ap-
plicable to States Parties anywhere in the world, or whether some sort of spatial test for
applicability should be read into them and, if so, what constitutes the limits of that test.
63.TheCourt hasmade an important contribution to these debates, through adopt-
ing two distinct approaches to extraterritorial applicability. In the ﬁrst place, the Court
in effect read in to treaties a concept of jurisdiction, which it then determined to apply
extraterritorially. In the second place, the Court offered a more simple afﬁrmation of
extraterritorial applicability, without explaining the basis for this.
64.As indicated above, the Inter-AmericanCommission onHumanRights had read
a concept of “jurisdiction” into the American Declaration on Human Rights (not a
treaty), which did not contain an express reference to this word, as a way into afﬁrming
its extraterritorial applicability. This approach was taken up (without acknowledgment
of its origins, as an idea, in the Commission’s decision about the Declaration) and
applied by the ICJ in relation to the ICESCR in the Wall Advisory Opinion and the
AfricanCharter and theCRCOptional Protocol inDRCv.Uganda. All of these instru-
mentswere treated as if they contained the “jurisdiction” trigger, as away in to afﬁrming
that they were capable of extraterritorial application on the basis of the performance of
80 See the discussions in the literature cited above, n.42; for one example of a commen-
tator who advocates this position, see Michael J. Dennis, above n.42. For Israel’s pos-
ition with respect to the ICCPR, see e.g.Wall Advisory Opinion, above n.4, para.110,
and sources cited therein.
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activity by the State which fell within the scope of this concept.81 In theWall Advisory
Opinion, theCourtmentions the positions of Israel and theCommittee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights on the question of the applicability of the ICESCR to Israel
in the Palestinian territories.82 Whereas it rejects Israel’s advocacy of inapplicability,
in contrast to its discussion of the position of theHumanRights Committee in relation
to the ICCPR, it does not expressly associate the position of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights advocating applicability (either generally or in
relation to Israel in the Palestinian territories in particular) with its own afﬁrmation
of this view.83
65. Here, it is a matter not, as earlier, of interpreting a treaty provision termed “jur-
isdiction” as having an extraterritorial meaning, but, rather, of afﬁrming the extraterri-
torial applicability of the obligations in the instrument by reading into it a concept for
applicability called “jurisdiction” which has an extraterritorial component. This takes
(without acknowledgment) an approach adopted in one decision by a regional body in
relation to one instrument, not at issue in the case before it, and treats it as relevantmore
generally, to certain other human rights treaties that do not have an explicit concept of
“jurisdiction” triggering applicability.
66. A second approach to the extraterritorial scope of treaties with a free-standing
conception of applicability provisions is simpler. It was adopted by the UK House of
Lords in the Roma Rights case of 2004 concerning the posting of UK immigration ofﬁ-
cials at the Prague airport.84 Lady Hale and Lord Steyn both assumed that the prohib-
ition of discrimination on grounds of race in CERD applied extraterritorially, without
recourse to a particular factual doctrine such as the exercise of “jurisdiction”which had
to be met in order for the obligations to be in play.85
67. The effect of the ICJ’s 1998 Order on provisional measures in the Georgia
v. Russia case is to offer further support to this “free-standing” approach to applicability.
The Court stated that it:
… observes that there is no restriction of a general nature in CERD relating to its
territorial application;whereas it furthernotes that, inparticular, neitherArticle 2
nor Article 5 of CERD, alleged violations of which [by Russia in Georgia] are
invoked by Georgia, contain a speciﬁc territorial limitation… the Court conse-
quently ﬁnds that these provisions of CERDgenerally appear to apply, like other
81 On the ICESCR, see Wall Advisory Opinion, above n.4, paras.111–112; on the
ACHPR and the CRC Optional Protocol, see DRC v. Uganda Judgment, above
n.4, paras.216–217.
82 Wall Advisory Opinion, above n.4, para.112.
83 Ibid.
84 See Roma Rights case, above n.63, para.4 (op. Lord Bingham).
85 See ibid., paras.97–102 (op. Lady Hale); paras.44 and 46 (op. Lord Steyn).
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provisions of instruments of that nature, to the actions of a State partywhen it acts
beyond its territory…86
TheCourt’sOrdercalledupon“[b]othParties,withinSouthOssetia andAbkhazia and
adjacent areas in Georgia” to take certain acts to comply with the Convention, a deter-
mination that assumed the extraterritorial application of CERD to Russian forces in
Georgia.87
68. This decision offers a particular approach to understanding the extraterritorial
application of those treaties such as the CERDwith free-standingmodels of applicabil-
ity not expressly qualiﬁed by jurisdiction: the absence of a restriction on applicability,
whether of a general character, or speciﬁc to the particular obligations in the treaty at
issue, should be taken to suggest that the provisions should apply. In other words, as
far as the signiﬁcance of treaty provisions is concerned, the enquiry on extraterritorial
applicability depends on not establishing this in a positive sense, but, rather, establish-
ing whether it has been ruled out negatively though restrictive provisions. Such an ap-
proach to treaties with free-standing provisions can be seen as offering a potential
explanation for the approach adopted by the UK House of Lords in Roma Rights,
and a general doctrine to be followed in relation to such treaties, as an alternative to
the approach of reading a concept of “jurisdiction” into them.
IX. The Court’s contribution (4): On the “exceptional” nature of
extraterritorial activity and its regulation by human rights law
69.However controversial and important extraterritorial State actions are, and however
fundamental to the interests of the relevant States and those in the territories affected
they may be in certain cases, taken as a whole they are exceptional when compared
with the presence and activities of State authorities within their sovereign territories.
Thus in the Wall Advisory Opinion the ICJ stated, in relation to the ICCPR, that
“… while the exercise of jurisdiction is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exer-
cised outside the State territory”.88 The Court went on:
Considering the object andpurpose of the…Covenant… itwould seemnatural
that, even when such is the case, States parties to the Covenant should be bound
by its provisions.89
86 Georgia v. Russia (Provisional Measures), above n.4, para. 109.
87 Ibid. para.149.
88 Wall Advisory Opinion, above n.4, para.109.
89 Ibid.
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Similarly, in relation to the ICESCR, the Court stated that:
… thisCovenant guarantees rights which are essentially territorial.However, it is
not to be excluded that it applies both to territories over which a State party has
sovereignty and to those over which that State exercises territorial jurisdiction.90
70. Here, then, the Court is being descriptive about the exercise of jurisdiction in the
sense of a State presence (the particular activity performed by Israel at issue before it)
reﬂecting the fact that States Parties to theCovenant (taken as awhole) do not normally
engage in this activity as a matter of fact outside their territory. These observations are
signiﬁcant because of how they echo an earlier statement made by the European Court
of Human Rights, and how they have potentially a signiﬁcantly different import, in
terms of the implications for the scope of extraterritorial applicability, from an earlier
statement by the Strasbourg Court.
71. In the Banković decision concerning theNATObombing of Serbia in 1999, the
European Court of Human Rights stated that that jurisdiction is “essentially” territor-
ial, with extraterritorial jurisdiction subsisting only in “exceptional” circumstances.91
However, in this observation the Court seemed to suggest that somehow the “excep-
tional” character of extraterritorial jurisdiction should be understood not only in a
factual sense. Also, it should also be the basis for attenuating the scope of the
meaning of “jurisdiction” in international human rights law, and should perform
this function in an autonomousmanner from the factual exceptionalism. The autono-
mous nature of this exceptionalism creates the possibility that even if a State is acting
“exceptionally” as a matter of fact outside its territory, such a situation might not fall
within its “jurisdiction” for the purposes of human rights law. In other words, only a
sub-set of extraterritorial activity will be regulated by human rights law.
72. The dictum from Bankovićwas afﬁrmed at certain stages in the English courts of
the Al-Skeini case concerning the UK’s military presence in Iraq, although by way of
simple recitation only.92 In the Strasbourg judgment in that case, the European
Court of Human Rights stated:
A State’s jurisdictional competence under Article 1 is primarily territorial…Jur-
isdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the State’s territory…
Conversely, acts of the Contracting States performed, or producing effects,
outside their territories can constitute an exercise of jurisdiction within the
meaning of Article 1 only in exceptional cases…
90 Wall Advisory Opinion, above n.4, p. 180 para.112.
91 Banković, above n.60, para.67.
92 See Al-Skeini (HC), above n.63, paras.245 and 269; Al-Skeini (CA), above n.63,
paras.75–76.
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Todate, theCourt in its case-law has recognised a numberof exceptional circumstances
capable of giving rise to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Contracting State outside its
own territorial boundaries. In each case, the question whether exceptional circum-
stances existwhich require and justifyaﬁndingby theCourt that theStatewas exercising
jurisdiction extraterritorially must be determined with reference to the particular
facts.93
This statement seems to suggest that, necessarily, human rights law does not apply to
all the extraterritorial actions of States—even if States perform “acts . . . outside their
territories”, such acts can only “constitute an exercise of jurisdiction within the
meaning of Article 1”, that is to be regulated by the obligations in the treaty, “in excep-
tional cases”.
73. This doctrine of the “exceptional” extraterritorial application of human rights
obligations has only ever been afﬁrmed in the context of the ECHR. Moreover, even
in relation to that instrument it was absent from the case law before the Banković deci-
sionof2001.Nonetheless, it appears to suggest a signiﬁcantly different approach to“ex-
ceptionalism” from that articulated by the ICJ in the Wall Advisory Opinion, which
was issued after Banković. For the ICJ, exceptionalism was only an issue in terms of
the frequency of extraterritorial State action; it was not also a doctrine to limit the cir-
cumstanceswhen this actionwould be regulated by human rights lawwhen it occurred.
74. The absence of an afﬁrmation of the latter doctrine places the Wall Advisory
Opinion alongside the decisions of other bodies such as the Inter-American Commis-
sion of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee, supporting the absence of
such a doctrine fromhuman rights lawgenerally and furthermarginalizing the apparent
afﬁrmation of the doctrine in the context of the ECHR.
X. The Court’s contribution (5): Whether human rights treaty
obligations should apply to a State acting in territory not falling
within the sovereign territory of another contracting party to the
treaty
75. An idea has become associated with the ECHR, based on an interpretation of a
dictum from the European Court of Human Rights in the aforementioned Banković
decision about the “legal space” or “espace juridique” of the Convention, which has
fundamental consequences for the question of extraterritorial applicability. Although
advanced and afﬁrmed only with respect to the European Convention, as an idea it
is transferrable to other human rights treaties.
76. This idea is as follows: a particular action taken by one State in the territory of
another State would not be governed by the Convention obligations of the ﬁrst
State, if the second State is not also a party to the Convention, even if in other respects
93 Al-Skeini (ECtHR), above n.50, paras.131–132.
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the act in question meets the test for extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Convention
(for instance the State exercises effective territorial control). Under this view, although
the concept of “jurisdiction” under the ECHR is not limited to a State’s own territory,
the applicability of the treaty as a whole is limited to the overall territory of contracting
States. In consequence, States actingoutside the“territorial space”of theECHRarenot
bound by their obligations in that instrument, even if they are exercising effective
control over territory and/or individuals. This is a severe limitation as far as the
ECHR is concerned, since most of the world’s States, including some of the key
sites of extraterritorial action by certain European States, fall outside the “legal
space” of the ECHR.
77. This concept, although articulated in relation to the ECHR, is of signiﬁcance
more broadly to situations where States act in territory in respect of which they lack
title, and which does not form part of another State that is also bound by the same
human rights obligations as they are. This would cover territory of a State that is not
a party to the same human rights treaty, and non-State territory that, necessarily,
does not fall within the territory of any State bound by any human rights treaties at
all. It would also cover territory of a State that is party to the same treaty but subject
to different obligations under it, whether through reservations, declarations or a diver-
gent position as far as additional instruments such as optional protocols to the treaty are
concerned. This is not, then, a rejection of the extraterritorial application of human
rights law in toto; it is a rejection of human rights norms that have not yet been univer-
sally accepted/accepted at least by a State with sovereignty (as title) over the territory
concerned, even if they have been accepted by the foreign State acting in that territory.
78. The signiﬁcance of this idea is illustrated by the following three examples of
exclusions that would be effected by this limitation. In the ﬁrst place, no European
State acting in Afghanistan, or taking action in the territorial waters of States and/or
the high seas off the Horn of Africa with respect to so-called “piracy”, or taking migra-
tion-related action in the territorial waters of North African States and/or the high seas
in theMediterranean,would be boundby theECHR. In the secondplace, no action by
any State on the high seas, or off the coast of theWestern Sahara (a non-State territory),
whether piracy or migration-related, is covered by any human rights treaty obligations
whatsoever. In the third place, Israel would not be bound by any of its international
human rights treaty obligations with respect to the Palestinian territories.
79. This sets up a two-tier system of human rights protection: States may act abroad
in amanner that impacts on human rights, but such action is only regulated by human
rights obligations if these had already been in operation in the territories in question.
Such a system echoes legal distinctions operating in the colonial era in levels of civiliza-
tion and as between themetropolis and the colony as far as the level of rights protection
is concerned. Indeed, with the ECHR the distinction in rights protection necessarily
operates according to a European/non-European axis—Turkey in northern Cyprus:
yes; that State and other European States in Iraq: no.
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80. Whether or not such an exclusion actually operates with respect to the ECHR
and its Protocols has been addressed in both case law and academic commentary.94
Such discussion has included coverage of broader normative issues concerning
whether the absence of such a limitation, and the consequent application of human
rights standards that were not previously applicable in the territory, would constitute
“human rights imperialism” and also potentially risk, where it is co-applicable, adher-
ence to certain norms of occupation law.95
81. InDRCv.Uganda, theCourt held that the nature of the extraterritorial action by
the State at issue, Uganda, met the test for triggering the law of occupation. Applying
Uganda’s human rights obligationswas not capable of raising a “legal space”problemas
set out above, however, because the DRC was also a party to the treaties at issue. Simi-
larly, inGeorgia v. Russia, the Court was concerned with the extraterritorial application
of a human rights treaty that was binding on both the State acting extraterritorially, and
the State in whose territory the former State was acting. These two cases were equiva-
lent, then, to the Strasbourg cases about Turkey in northern Cyprus: one State being
bound by its obligations when acting in the territory of another State also a party to
the treaty or treaties containing the obligations at issue. Everything was happening
within the “legal space” of the treaty or treaties.
82. In theWall Advisory Opinion, however, the Court was considering the applic-
ability of human rights treaties that were not already in operation in the particular sense
that the Territory—Palestine—did not itself constitute a State party to human rights
treaties, nor was it regarded as forming part of the territory of another State party to
such treaties. The situation was, therefore, in this sense outside the “legal space” of
these instruments. It might have been said, then, that to apply the treaty obligations
to Israel in the Palestinian territories would fall foul of a limitation on applicability
to the “legal space” of the treaties at issue. However, such a view was not expressed
by the Court, and the treaties were regarded as applicable to Israel, thereby necessarily
rejecting the “legal space” limitation idea in its entirety.
XI. Signiﬁcance of the decisions on extraterritoriality
XI.A. Signiﬁcance for the law on extraterritoriality
83.When the ICJ issued theNamibia Advisory Opinion in 1971, the development of
international human rights treaty law, and its expert-body interpretation, was at a very
early stage—the twoglobal human rightsCovenants, forexample, hadbeen adopted (in
94 SeeBanković, aboven.60;Al-Skeini (DC), aboven.63;Al-Skeini (CA), aboven.63;Al-
Skeini (HL), above n.63; Al-Skeini (ECtHR), above n.50; RalphWilde, Compliance
with Human Rights Norms Extraterritorially, above n.4.
95 See Ralph Wilde, Compliance with Human Rights Norms Extraterritorially, above
n.42.
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1966) but were not yet in force (that happened in 1976).96 The question of the
extraterritorial application of this law had not been subject to any general expert
determination.97 When that happened later, the ideas expressed by the Court can be
clearly identiﬁed. Although, then, the Court did not itself pronounce upon inter-
national human rights treaty law for some time afterNamibia, that decisionnonetheless
deserves a central place in the canon of international human rights law jurisprudence
not only for the commonly acknowledged signiﬁcance it has for UN law and the law
of self-determination,98 but also because of this link with later expert-body determina-
tions on the extraterritorial application of human rights law.
84.Moreover,when theCourt thenoffered its owncontributionon the latter subject
to sit alongside the expert-body determinations, this had an important role in consoli-
dating and supplementing a critical mass of authoritative interpretation on what was
and remains the highly contested and fundamentally important question of whether
human rights treaty obligations apply extraterritorially.
85.The ICJ’sﬁndingson the extraterritorial applicationofhuman rights laware con-
tained in a few passages, offering brief (if any) rationales, and forming part of decisions
covering a much broader set of issues. The other case law on this topic, by contrast, in
some instances includes lengthy treatment with signiﬁcant reasoning and engagement
with background and underlying matters.99 Yet in a few brief statements in three deci-
sions, the Court bolstered the case for an afﬁrmative answer to this question, and in a
manner that widened the scope of the judicial and quasi-judicial conversation from
an isolated, treaty-speciﬁc treatment by dedicated interpretation bodies on what is a
common matter across the human rights treaty framework.
86. The case law in this ﬁeld is still somewhat sparse, and so the Court’s contribu-
tions are signiﬁcant, in reinforcing existing positions already articulated by expert
bodies (and further marginalizing the respective contrary positions afﬁrmed by some
States) and bringing its own view to bear in relation to certain instruments that had
not previously been subject to expert determination on the extraterritoriality issue. It
might be said that the three decisions, covering as they do six human rights treaties (in-
cluding both theUNCovenants), in consistently afﬁrming extraterritorial applicability
suggest a general orientation on this topic that favours human rights law operating
beyondborders. Such anapproach reinforces the case forapplicabilitymade indecisions
byother bodies, and enhances the future prospects for such a case to continue to prevail
when it is subject to determination in the future, whether at the Court or elsewhere.
96 See ICCPR, above n.6; ICESCR, above n.6.
97 See the decisions cited above nn.57–58.
98 For that common acknowledgement, see the sources cited above, n.2, and Bruno
Simma, above n.1.
99 See the cases cited above, nn.50, 57, 59, 60, 63.
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XI.B. The special ﬁt between the Court and the extraterritoriality issue
87. Earlier it was observed that the relative balance in frequency between addressing
fundamental matters of law and applying the law to the facts is tilted more towards
the former in the case of the ICJ and the latter in the case of human rights tribunals.
It was speculated that this might make the Court relatively more conﬁdent and
expert in matters of interpretation. The signiﬁcance of this general point is acute
when it comes to the question of extraterritorial applicability, because here interpret-
ation bodies have to determine the fundamental question of whether the law is even
in operation to begin with. Not only, moreover, is there a signiﬁcant link between
the topic of extraterritorial applicability, as a fundamental question, and the relative ex-
perience of the ICJ in addressing questions of this type. Also,more speciﬁcally, the par-
ticular way in which the question is fundamental—being about what law applies—is
also signiﬁcant to theCourt’s work,where cases often involve determinations of applic-
able law, as compared to human rights bodies, where questions of interpretation are
more commonly limited to what the law means, not also what law is to be interpreted
in the ﬁrst place.
88. Indeed, in two of the three cases under present evaluation—theWall Advisory
Opinion and DRC v. Uganda, human rights law was one of multiple areas of inter-
national law that were potentially applicable, and so determinations on applicability
had to be made across multiple legal regimes. Before a human rights expert body the
question of the applicability of the relevant treaty is effectively determinative as far as
the jurisdiction of the tribunal is concerned: if the law is not applicable, then, necessar-
ily, the tribunal has no jurisdiction over the situation at issue. An equivalent situation
prevailed only in theGeorgia v. Russia case; in the other two decisions, a ﬁnding on the
applicability of human rights law was not essential for there to be a case. Moreover, it
might be speculated that the frequency of jurisdictional disputes before the ICJ,
regarded by commentators in the context of the functioning of international mechan-
isms of dispute settlement as a deﬁciency in the system,100 does at least have the
100For example, writing in 2000, in a personal capacity, Rosalyn Higgins observed:
There is scarcely a case based on the optional Clause in whichthe defendant State does not
insist that the Court does not, in the particular event, have jurisdiction—usually because a
reservation is said to apply to the matters at hand. So the Court has ﬁrst to hold hearings
to determine its own jurisdiction. This delays the coming to themerits. In the hands of com-
petent counsel the prospects for delay and challenge as to jurisdiction may be very extended
indeed.
The net result is that, evenwhere the challenges have notmuch strength, the coming on of
themerits is longdelayed.And a further result is that too large a percentage of theCourt’s time
is spent on resolving its own jurisdiction. It is really not satisfactory that it should be thus after
ﬁfty years of this Courts existence, and eighty years have passed since the Permanent Court
was established.This state of affairs reﬂects a depressing immaturity in international relations.
Rosalyn Higgins, above n.8, section V (emphasis in original).
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advantage ofmaking theCourt very familiar with contests which determinewhether or
not cases will be heard in the ﬁrst place.
89. As discussed earlier, involvement in extraterritorial activity, although signiﬁcant
and often controversial, is unusual when considered in the broader context of all the
things that a State normally does and how this impacts on human rights. In the
main, therefore, international human rights bodies considering the extent to which
State activities comply with human rights obligations spendmost of their time addres-
sing what is happening within any given State, as far as that State’s obligations are con-
cerned, and relatively little time on extraterritorial activity. In consequence, their
treatment of extraterritorial issues, including the entry-level question of applicability,
constitutes but a small fraction of their jurisprudence. At the ICJ, by contrast, no
doubt largely determined by the inter-State character of its jurisdiction, most jurispru-
dence on human rights law has been about the extraterritorial context. The partial
nature of the ICJ’s jurisdiction, then, has led to the dominance of extraterritorial
human rights issues within the corpus of its human rights jurisprudence generally,
when compared to the jurisprudence of the specialist bodies.
90. Not only does the inter-State character of the Court’s jurisdiction mean that
human rights issues in the extraterritorial context are more likely to come up. Also,
the Court’s relative familiarity with extraterritorial issues more generally means that
its treatment of the human rights aspects falls within the broader sphere of inter-
State activity with which it is comfortable and experienced. Although its movement
into the human rights ﬁeld is relatively recent when compared to the activity of
human rights bodies, paradoxically it is the Court, not human rights bodies, that has
had a long-standing role in adjudicating international legal matters that concern the
transnational or cross-border context. A related point is that the extreme, controversial
and sometimes, for the populations and States involved, existential nature of the
subject-matter at issue—war, occupation etc.—is, for the Court, if not the norm, cer-
tainly more familiar, in terms of the frequency with which it comes up, than it is to
human rights bodies. Determining the question of extraterritorial applicability is the
gateway, potentially, to adjudicating, for example, on the aspects of the hugely con-
tested matter of the conduct of an armed conﬂict and/or occupation. The ICJ is
much more used to crossing such thresholds (albeit usually applying other areas of
law) than human rights bodies are.
XI.C. Broader lessons for debates on the role of the ICJ in human rights
91. Although, then, the Court has had a signiﬁcant role in the development of authori-
tative jurisprudence on the extraterritorial application of international human rights
treaty law, the foregoing analysis indicates that there are special factors suggesting an
exceptional ﬁt between the Court’s broader role and this particular issue, as distinct
from human rights matters more generally. What, then, if anything, can be drawn
from the extraterritoriality case study for the broader question of the role of the
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Court compared to that of specialist tribunals on human rights issues generally, as dis-
tinct from extraterritorial human rights issues in particular?
92. At the very least, it suggests that the view that the Court, as a generalist and inter-
State body, is somehowalways to be assumed to be in an inferior positionwhen it comes
to making pronouncements upon human rights issues when compared to specialist
bodies is incorrect. Within this general insight, it suggests that one of the explanations
given for such an assumption, the inter-State character of the Court’s jurisdiction, may
sometimes not only fail to support the assumption, but also push things in the opposite
direction, leading if anything to comparative advantage on the part of the Court.More
generally, indeed, for this reason and/or others it suggests that the Court might be if
anything in a better position to adjudicate on human rights matters in some instances.
93. The question, then, is whether this lesson from extraterritoriality is transferable
to other situations, and, if so, in which circumstances. The foregoing analysis suggests
that the following features of the Court’s role and character need to be considered, in
terms of their signiﬁcance to the particular human rights topic at hand: its inter-
State character; its familiarity with fundamental legal questions; its long-standing prac-
tice of andexperience in ranging across all areas of lawandapplyingmultipleﬁelds of law
simultaneously, in terms of more than one area of human rights law (e.g. multiple
human rights treaties) and other areas of law in addition to human rights law.
94. It will be for work on other areas of human rights law to test whether not one or
more of these factorsmight sometimes push towards an appreciation that the ICJmight
“add value” when compared to treatment by a specialist tribunal. But one example
might be offered in overview.
95.Most States are bound bymultiple human rights treaties, but international scru-
tiny bodies are typically treaty-speciﬁc. In the absence of a “World Court of Human
Rights” and/or an effort to harmonize/consolidate the international reporting
mechanisms beyond the general reviews performed by the Human Rights Council,
the ICJ is in a unique position, in principle, to be able to address a particular situation
with reference to the entire applicable normative framework as amatter of human rights
(and also consider, and in a potentiallymore even-handedway, not being especially tied
to one particular instrument as it starting point, how the meaning of this framework is
mediated by the interplay with other applicable law). Just as on the question of whether
human rights obligations apply extraterritorially the Court was, when the terms of its
jurisdiction permitted it, able to look at the entire legal picture rather than a sub-set
of it (viz. in DRC v. Uganda and the Wall Advisory Opinion, but not in Georgia
v. Russia) so more generally, in any context, it may sometimes be in a position to
offer a more complete treatment of compliance with the applicable law (assuming, of
course, that in the particular circumstances this is desirable).
96. Finally, the case studyon extraterritoriality suggests that there ismerit inwhatwas
said earlier about the utility of disaggregating appraisals of the Court’s potential role in
terms of meaning/interpretation issues, on the one hand, and application/
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enforcement issues, on the other. The Court’s role on former issues is different, and
certain matters cut differently when compared to a consideration of them in the
context of latter issues. For example, the “State-centric” nature of the Court does
not, on matters of interpretation, degrade its potential in the ﬁeld of human rights in-
terpretation in the samewayas itmight in the realmof enforcement.Clearly, this nature
may render theCourt’s contributions limited in quantum and scope overall (few cases,
nodirect remedies for individuals) butwhenone focuses on interpretation inparticular,
the limitations appear different, given that a few decisions on key questions can have a
ripple effect in inﬂuencing how these questions are then addressed across human rights
bodies generally. Making general determinations which have the potential to be fol-
lowed in any individual case where the same legal principles come to be applied by spe-
cialist bodies is a signiﬁcant, not limited, function. Itwouldbe fanciful to expect the ICJ
tobecome amajor player in the enforcement of human rights to rival specialist tribunals
in this respect. But theCourt’s jurisprudence on the question of whether human rights
treaties apply extraterritoriality suggests, by contrast, the potential for amuchmore sig-
niﬁcant role when it comes to interpretation matters on fundamental issues.
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